This article examines the relations between the choice theory of rights of rights and Hillel Steiner's conception of freedom. It challenges Steiner's attempt to found the right to equal freedom purely on respect for persons, and offers an alternative foundation based on respect for persons together with people's interest in enjoying freedom. Affirming the ideal of respect without affirming an interest in freedom leaves us with an indeterminate set of distributive entitlements. Affirming an interest in freedom without insisting on respect for persons opens the door to a proliferation of interest-based rights. Grounding a theory of justice both on respect for persons and on their interest in freedom, on the other hand, allows us to defend the libertarian and egalitarian spirit of Steiner’s theory of justice in a way that avoids both of these consequences.
Respect for Persons and the Interest in Freedom
CARTER, IAN FRANK
2009-01-01
Abstract
This article examines the relations between the choice theory of rights of rights and Hillel Steiner's conception of freedom. It challenges Steiner's attempt to found the right to equal freedom purely on respect for persons, and offers an alternative foundation based on respect for persons together with people's interest in enjoying freedom. Affirming the ideal of respect without affirming an interest in freedom leaves us with an indeterminate set of distributive entitlements. Affirming an interest in freedom without insisting on respect for persons opens the door to a proliferation of interest-based rights. Grounding a theory of justice both on respect for persons and on their interest in freedom, on the other hand, allows us to defend the libertarian and egalitarian spirit of Steiner’s theory of justice in a way that avoids both of these consequences.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
