We consider vertical differentiation with quality uncertainty and information disparities, in a duopoly where products have credence attributes and a minimum quality standard exists.Optimistic misperceptions further relax price competition but uninformed consumers may be cheated in equilibrium due to minimum product differentiation when informed consumers buy low quality goods. Optimistic misperceptions turn out to be an incentive for product differentiation when informed consumers buy high quality goods, even if the real quality differential is always lower than expected by uninformed consumers.Increasing the share of informed consumers may counterbalance the effect of optimism on equilibrium prices but in the meantime reduce the incentives for product differentiation
Vertical Differentiation With Optimistic Misperceptions And Information Disparities
Alberto Cavaliere
2017-01-01
Abstract
We consider vertical differentiation with quality uncertainty and information disparities, in a duopoly where products have credence attributes and a minimum quality standard exists.Optimistic misperceptions further relax price competition but uninformed consumers may be cheated in equilibrium due to minimum product differentiation when informed consumers buy low quality goods. Optimistic misperceptions turn out to be an incentive for product differentiation when informed consumers buy high quality goods, even if the real quality differential is always lower than expected by uninformed consumers.Increasing the share of informed consumers may counterbalance the effect of optimism on equilibrium prices but in the meantime reduce the incentives for product differentiationI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.