Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.
Welfare Effects of Two-Part Discriminatory Tariffs Constrained by Caps
BERTOLETTI, PAOLO;
1997-01-01
Abstract
Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.File in questo prodotto:
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