Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.
Welfare Effects of Two-Part Discriminatory Tariffs Constrained by Caps / BERTOLETTI Paolo; POLETTI Clara. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 56:3(1997), pp. 293-296.
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Titolo: | Welfare Effects of Two-Part Discriminatory Tariffs Constrained by Caps |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 1997 |
Rivista: | |
Citazione: | Welfare Effects of Two-Part Discriminatory Tariffs Constrained by Caps / BERTOLETTI Paolo; POLETTI Clara. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 56:3(1997), pp. 293-296. |
Abstract: | Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11571/103183 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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