The paper examines the optimal two-part tariff problem in the residential electricity sector. It is shown that, even with distributional concerns, the optimal tariff for a public monopoly is not uniform across regions if marginal costs are differentiated. This sub-optimality result does extend to the case of a regulated private monopoly. It is also shown that the imposition of a uniform tariff constraint gives raise to trade-off between equity and efficiency. Finally, a simple tariff reform is examined, proving able to provide (both for a public and a private monopoly) a strong Pareto improvement.
Tariffa uniforme e regolamentazione dei ricavi nel settore elettrico dei consumi domestici
BERTOLETTI, PAOLO;
1997-01-01
Abstract
The paper examines the optimal two-part tariff problem in the residential electricity sector. It is shown that, even with distributional concerns, the optimal tariff for a public monopoly is not uniform across regions if marginal costs are differentiated. This sub-optimality result does extend to the case of a regulated private monopoly. It is also shown that the imposition of a uniform tariff constraint gives raise to trade-off between equity and efficiency. Finally, a simple tariff reform is examined, proving able to provide (both for a public and a private monopoly) a strong Pareto improvement.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
