This paper reconsiders a model proposed by De Fraja (1993) to compare public and private production under complete and incomplete information. It is argued, in contrast to previous results, that such a model provides no convincing grounds to sustain the productive superiority of public ownership. It is also suggested that meaningful comparisons of efficiency require settings where differences in ownership imply different implementation constraints.
On Endogenous Efficiency in Public and Private Firms
BERTOLETTI, PAOLO
2001-01-01
Abstract
This paper reconsiders a model proposed by De Fraja (1993) to compare public and private production under complete and incomplete information. It is argued, in contrast to previous results, that such a model provides no convincing grounds to sustain the productive superiority of public ownership. It is also suggested that meaningful comparisons of efficiency require settings where differences in ownership imply different implementation constraints.File in questo prodotto:
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