In my contribution, I examine two philosophical perspectives on inter-subjectivity considered not as an ontological problem (the problem of other minds and their metaphysical inaccessibility), but rather as the problem of the experience of otherness. Both perspectives are based on concepts allowing to describe the experience of inter-subjectivity as an aesthetic experience. What is interesting is that both perspectives ground the understanding of meanings upon an aesthetic and imaginative bond with otherness, considered as plurality and co-presence of other subjects: the other isn’t conceived as the fusional other, or as the unknowable other, but is required for a meaningful experience. I am referring to the concept of Gemeinsinn, with which Kant proposes, in Critique of Judgment, the idea of a community based on aesthetic grounds, and to the concept of Übereinstimmung, with which Wittgenstein, in his late writings, proposes the idea of a community grounded on aesthetic-linguistic and pragmatic grounds. Inter-subjectivity, therefore, is seen as the making/formation of a “we-perspective”: conceived as such, it establishes a bond of sociability, and, by means of an argument I would like to define quasi-transcendental, it is assumed by both philosophers as the condition for constituting a possible community. Being philosophical concepts, Gemeinsinn and Übereinstimmung don’t describe real communities; yet, they are useful to reflect on the conditions for an anthropological community. By means of the concept of Gemeinsinn, Kant develops an aesthetic, pre-predicative and imaginative paradigm of the inter-subjective understanding of meanings: it is in fact the foundation of a sentimental community. It is very significant that the concept of community was developed by Kant in his aesthetic work (see Lyotard 1995 and Amoroso 1984). In fact, in the theoretical domain (Critique of Pure Reason) and in the moral domain (Critique of Practical Reason), Kant does not pose the problem of the foundation of the community: in these domains the community needs not to be founded. In the theoretical domain, indeed, it is included and implicit in the universal principles of natural legislation, whereas in the practical domain it is included in the definition of the moral law. Mutatis mutandis, we can find the idea of a sentimental community in Wittgenstein’s concept of Übereinstimmung. I will maintain that this concept, which we can connect to the concepts of seeing as and feeling as, and therefore to imaginative (inter-corporeal) understanding of meanings, is conceived by Wittgenstein as the coming to an agreement that is not a matter of fact (a contract) or a convention, but a “being bound to sense” within a form of life.

We perspective on aesthetic grounds: Gemeinsinn and Übereinstimmung in Kant and Wittgenstein

Silvana Borutti
2017-01-01

Abstract

In my contribution, I examine two philosophical perspectives on inter-subjectivity considered not as an ontological problem (the problem of other minds and their metaphysical inaccessibility), but rather as the problem of the experience of otherness. Both perspectives are based on concepts allowing to describe the experience of inter-subjectivity as an aesthetic experience. What is interesting is that both perspectives ground the understanding of meanings upon an aesthetic and imaginative bond with otherness, considered as plurality and co-presence of other subjects: the other isn’t conceived as the fusional other, or as the unknowable other, but is required for a meaningful experience. I am referring to the concept of Gemeinsinn, with which Kant proposes, in Critique of Judgment, the idea of a community based on aesthetic grounds, and to the concept of Übereinstimmung, with which Wittgenstein, in his late writings, proposes the idea of a community grounded on aesthetic-linguistic and pragmatic grounds. Inter-subjectivity, therefore, is seen as the making/formation of a “we-perspective”: conceived as such, it establishes a bond of sociability, and, by means of an argument I would like to define quasi-transcendental, it is assumed by both philosophers as the condition for constituting a possible community. Being philosophical concepts, Gemeinsinn and Übereinstimmung don’t describe real communities; yet, they are useful to reflect on the conditions for an anthropological community. By means of the concept of Gemeinsinn, Kant develops an aesthetic, pre-predicative and imaginative paradigm of the inter-subjective understanding of meanings: it is in fact the foundation of a sentimental community. It is very significant that the concept of community was developed by Kant in his aesthetic work (see Lyotard 1995 and Amoroso 1984). In fact, in the theoretical domain (Critique of Pure Reason) and in the moral domain (Critique of Practical Reason), Kant does not pose the problem of the foundation of the community: in these domains the community needs not to be founded. In the theoretical domain, indeed, it is included and implicit in the universal principles of natural legislation, whereas in the practical domain it is included in the definition of the moral law. Mutatis mutandis, we can find the idea of a sentimental community in Wittgenstein’s concept of Übereinstimmung. I will maintain that this concept, which we can connect to the concepts of seeing as and feeling as, and therefore to imaginative (inter-corporeal) understanding of meanings, is conceived by Wittgenstein as the coming to an agreement that is not a matter of fact (a contract) or a convention, but a “being bound to sense” within a form of life.
2017
9781138221000
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11571/1205908
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