Constructing Reality. The "Operationalization" of Bateson’s Conjecture on Cognition

Strictly following the direction outlined by Bateson, this study (which expands and completes some ideas presented, although in another context, in Mella 2014) seeks to operationalize Bateson’s Conjecture on Cognition, proposing three objectives: (1) above all, to make Bateson’s definition of “mind” operative; by introducing simple symbols, I show how it is possible for any “mind” – not necessarily only the human one – to construct descriptions of objects and definitions of concepts by simply making use of “primitive” operations involving comparison, the identification of differences, and analogy; the symbols introduced give a meaning to the observation, identification, and comparison of “objects” and “concepts,” which will allow me to formalize several models or moments that operationalize the concept of “cognition”; (2) to apply the same conceptual framework to define the process of denomination through which the “mind” manages to represent objects (descriptions) and concepts (definitions) through “signs” (descriptions of signs) and “signifiers” (definitions of signs), thereby forming semes; (3) to apply the symbols and the concepts of description, definition, and denomination to operationally deal with the problem of “truth” as correspondence, making use of a reliable process of determination. To achieve these objectives, a simple formal symbology is proposed to represent the basic elements of cognition and communication to demonstrate how the cognitive process can be linked to a succession of acts entailing distinction, description, definition, and recognition. More specifically, based on the notion of Observative Dimension, the Observative Universe is defined as a vector of dimensions through which the “mind” filters reality and constructs a Technical Description (not yet adopting specific language) as a vector of the states of those dimensions determined for a specific object “O.” Thanks to the innate process of analogy and analogical generalization, the “mind” starts from descriptions repeated for a set of objects – held to be analogous, though different – to arrive at the Technical Definition of a “general object O∗,” which, in fact, represents the concept (idea) of O∗ as well as the meaning (signified) of the signs that denote it. Knowing the world means carrying out descriptions of “O” and constructing definitions of “O∗” as the class of all “Os” recognized as elements (examples) of “O∗.” The same symbology is applied to define the basic elements of the process of “linguistic denomination” and the formation of languages through a “signification process” that couples a technical definition of “O∗,” which represents the signified of the “general sign S∗,” to the technical definition of “S∗,” which represents the signifier of “O∗.” Communication is the basis for the arguments made in the final part of the book, which demonstrates that even the Tarskian correspondence- truth “‘the snow is white’ is true if and only if the snow is white” requires processes of definition and description which are at the basis of knowledge. Therefore, operationalizing Bateson’s hypothesis means proposing a formalized and coherent structure of propositions that form an interpretative theory of the modus operandi of the (human) “mind.” This structure of propositions will be useful not only in shedding light on our cognitive processes but also in laying the formal groundwork for artificial intelligence. To make the operationalization process efficient, I used some typical models (Rings) of control systems (mentioned in a short APPENDIX) that make knowledge and learning possible, even if we are almost never aware of their activity because they operate at very high speed and in such a routine manner as to escape our attention. I conclude by highlighting several areas of research suggested by Bateson’s conjecture and based on my proposed operationalization process. Note: the text is rich in quotations because I preferred to directly