Abduction as “leading away”. Aristotle, Peirce, and the importance of eco-cognitive openness and situatedness

In this article I will take advantage of the logical and cognitive studies I have illustrated in my recent book emph{The Abductive Structure of Scientific Creativity. An Essay on the Ecology of Cognition} (2017), in which the process of building new hypotheses is clarified thanks to my emph{eco-cognitive model} (EC-Model) of abduction. Also resorting to a new interpretation of Aristotle's seminal work on abduction, I will emphasize the crucial role played in abductive cognition by the so-called ``optimization of eco-cognitive openness and situatedness''. Hence, we can gain a new positive perspective about the ``constitutive'' eco-cognitive character of abduction, just thanks to Aristotle himself. I also contend than a disregarded issue concerning abduction is related to the current lack of knowledge about what I call ``discoverability'' and ``diagnosticability''. In the formula above $Vdash_L^X$ indicates that inputs an outputs do not stand each other in an expected relation and that the modification of the inputs $?_I$ can provide the emph{abductive solution}. In general, in this characterization the direction is not from evidence/premises to abductive result but the forward fashion is adopted, where the inferential parameter $Vdash$ sets some appropriate logical relationship between an input which consists in both the abductive guess to be found and a background theory (or just some premisses), and an output -- for example an evidence, a novel phenomenon to be abductively ``explained'' through facts, rules, or even new theories. Further, in the case of scientific settings, this optimality is made possible by a maximization of changeability of both input and output: not only inputs have to be enriched with the possible solution but, to do that, other inputs have usually to be changed and/or modified. This changeability first of all refers to a wide epistemological openness.