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This volume explores abductive cognition, an important but, at least until the third quarter of the last century, neglected topic in cognition. The book aims at increasing knowledge about creative and expert inferences. The study of these high-levelmethods of abductive reasoning is situated at the crossroads of philosophy, logic, epistemology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, animal cognition and evolutionary theories; that is, at the heart of cognitive science. Philosophers of science in the twentieth century have traditionally distinguished between the inferential processes active in the logic of discovery and the ones active in the logic of justification. Most have concluded that no logic of creative processes exists and, moreover, that a rational model of discovery is impossible. In short, scientific creative inferences are irrational and there is no “reasoning” to hypotheses. On the other hand, some research in the area of artificial intelligence has shown that methods for discovery could be found that are computationally adequate for rediscovering – or discovering for the first time – empirical or theoretical laws and theorems.
Abductive Cognition, The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning
This volume explores abductive cognition, an important but, at least until the third quarter of the last century, neglected topic in cognition. The book aims at increasing knowledge about creative and expert inferences. The study of these high-levelmethods of abductive reasoning is situated at the crossroads of philosophy, logic, epistemology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cognitive psychology, animal cognition and evolutionary theories; that is, at the heart of cognitive science. Philosophers of science in the twentieth century have traditionally distinguished between the inferential processes active in the logic of discovery and the ones active in the logic of justification. Most have concluded that no logic of creative processes exists and, moreover, that a rational model of discovery is impossible. In short, scientific creative inferences are irrational and there is no “reasoning” to hypotheses. On the other hand, some research in the area of artificial intelligence has shown that methods for discovery could be found that are computationally adequate for rediscovering – or discovering for the first time – empirical or theoretical laws and theorems.
Recensioni:
Minds and Machines, Shelley Cameron, Review: Lorenzo Magnani: The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning, Springer, 2009, $157.00, ISBN 978-3-642-03630-9. XXX, 2012, xxx-xxx (forthcoming).
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, John Woods, Recent developments in abductive logic, Essay Review of Abductive Cognition. The Epistemologic and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning. Lorenzo Magnani: Springer, Heidelberg/Berlin; 2009, p. 536, Price £135 hardback, ISBN 978-3-642-03630-9. XXX, 2011, xxx-xxx (forthcoming) .
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Sami Paavola, Review of Lorenzo Magnani: Abductive Cognition: The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning (review),47 (2) 2011, pp. 252-256.
Journal of General Philosophy of Science, Sami Paavola, Lorenzo Magnani: Abductive Cognition. The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009, 534 pp., 160.45 €, ISBN 978-3-642-03630-9, XXX, 2011, 42, pp. 201-205.
Mind and Society, Paul Thagard, Review of L. Magnani: Abductive Cognition: the Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, New York, 2009, Cognitive Systems Monographs; 9(1) 2010, pp. 111-112.
Versus, Riccardo Fusaroli, review of Lorenzo Magnani, Abductive Cognition. The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning. Berlin/Heidelberg, New York, 2009, Cognitive Systems Monographs; 2010, pp. 113-115.
The Reasoner, Abductive Cognition Lorenzo Magnani (2009). Abductive Cognition. The Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning. Springer; 4(2) 2010, p. 23.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11571/138204
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