Libro verde e modernizzazione del diritto del lavoro: un quadro di riferimento teorico e concettuale

This paper examines the informative function of employment contracts in modern economies, starting from the assumption that the parties are rational actors, and adopting a neo-utilitarian methodology. It considers the optimal allocation of heterogeneous individuals in a context characterised by incomplete and asymmetrical information, and provides a survey of the literature on the economic theory of contracts, the optimal design of contracts, and agency relations. It is argued that complex contractual forms, both implicit and explicit, can reduce inefficiency in matching individuals and vacancies. In addition it describes the conflict between the objectives of providing incentives for employees and risk allocation in employment relations. In conclusion, it is argued that non-standard contracts can play an informative role, facilitating the transition towards standard contracts, by showing the commitment on the part of individuals in search of employment towards the needs of the employer, thus increasing their credibility.