Razionalità irrazionale: l’approccio bayesiano non spiega le scelte non conformiste negli esperimenti di Asch

Solomon Asch’s findings on independence and conformity are all too often misrepresented in current textbooks. After a description of his actual results, I try to model them within the theoretical paradigm of rational analysis. The Bayesian models that were developed can account for conformity, but not for independence, which was the prevalent behavior in Asch’s studies. For modeling independence, it is necessary to add to the models a variety of ad hoc assumptions inspired by infamous reasoning biases, such as overconfidence, positive control, and confirmation bias. The results are discussed within the scope of dual process theories of human thinking. They suggest a social role for some reasoning biases detrimental to individual reasoning. Finally, the conclusions extend the results to offer some thought-provoking reading of conformity and independence in society. For replicating, developing, and questioning the results, the runnable models that I used are available online.