In the Latin reception of Aristotle’s De sensu, sight and hearing are qualified as sensus disciplinales or disciplinabiles, i.e. senses that allow learning. The connection between these two senses and the process of learning can be assessed from two different, albeit complementary, points of view: that of the internal hierarchy of the various sense organs (why are sight and hearing more closely related to learning? And which of these two senses is most useful to this end?), and that of the hierarchy between living beings according to what the senses gradually allow them to learn. In this article, I propose to examine these two aspects considering three works by Albert the Great (De sensu, Metaphysica and De animalibus). The second issue is also linked, in Albert, to the question of the boundaries of the ‘human’: if some of the most complex living beings possess perceptive faculties very similar to those of human beings (and in some cases even – at least in appearance – superior), what specifically distinguishes human knowledge? And conversely, can this same interpretive scheme be used to place some beings (for instance, pygmies) in a subhuman sphere?
Monkeys, Pygmies, and Human Beings: Sensus disciplinales and the Hierarchy of Living Beings in Albert the Great
Gabriella Zuccolin
2023-01-01
Abstract
In the Latin reception of Aristotle’s De sensu, sight and hearing are qualified as sensus disciplinales or disciplinabiles, i.e. senses that allow learning. The connection between these two senses and the process of learning can be assessed from two different, albeit complementary, points of view: that of the internal hierarchy of the various sense organs (why are sight and hearing more closely related to learning? And which of these two senses is most useful to this end?), and that of the hierarchy between living beings according to what the senses gradually allow them to learn. In this article, I propose to examine these two aspects considering three works by Albert the Great (De sensu, Metaphysica and De animalibus). The second issue is also linked, in Albert, to the question of the boundaries of the ‘human’: if some of the most complex living beings possess perceptive faculties very similar to those of human beings (and in some cases even – at least in appearance – superior), what specifically distinguishes human knowledge? And conversely, can this same interpretive scheme be used to place some beings (for instance, pygmies) in a subhuman sphere?I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
