Standard rational expectations models with an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint either admit no solutions (incoherence) or multiple solutions (incompleteness). This paper shows that deviations from full-information rational expectations mitigate concerns about incoherence and incompleteness. Models with no rational expectations equilibria admit self-confirming equilibria involving the use of simple mis-specified forecasting models. Completeness and coherence are restored if expectations are adaptive or if agents are less forward-looking due to some information or behavioral friction. In the case of incompleteness, the E-stability criterion selects an equilibrium.

Coherence without rationality at the zero lower bound

Ascari G.
;
2023-01-01

Abstract

Standard rational expectations models with an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint either admit no solutions (incoherence) or multiple solutions (incompleteness). This paper shows that deviations from full-information rational expectations mitigate concerns about incoherence and incompleteness. Models with no rational expectations equilibria admit self-confirming equilibria involving the use of simple mis-specified forecasting models. Completeness and coherence are restored if expectations are adaptive or if agents are less forward-looking due to some information or behavioral friction. In the case of incompleteness, the E-stability criterion selects an equilibrium.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11571/1493189
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