Kant and Hegel on the Status of Glauben

The paper draws attention to the section of the Canon in the Critique of Pure Reason dedicated to Meinen, Wissen and Glauben and follows its origins and connections within the Aufklärung. After an evaluation of Jacobi’s position and Kant’s response in terms of a rational faith, it exposes Kant’s further steps in the direction of a growing separation between believing and knowing and conse- quently between faith and reason. For his part, Hegel rejects the opposition of Glauben and Wissen because the former is also a form of knowing. Hegel’s re-eval- uation of Jacobi’s thought after 1817 should not be overestimated, because the phi- losopher from Stuttgart in fact continues to express his disagreement with Jacobi’s Theory of Not-Knowing on several occasions, defending an epistemic as well as in- tersubjective concept of Glauben and a comprehensive theory of knowledge.