CINECA IRIS Institutional Research Information System
IRIS è la soluzione IT che facilita la raccolta e la gestione dei dati relativi alle attività e ai prodotti della ricerca. Fornisce a ricercatori, amministratori e valutatori gli strumenti per monitorare i risultati della ricerca, aumentarne la visibilità e allocare in modo efficace le risorse disponibili.
EnglishLanguage is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication in arbitrary finite two-player games.
Scheda prodotto non validato
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo
| Titolo: | The determinacy of equilibrium in economies of overlapping generations | |
| Autori: | ||
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2007 | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Abstract: | Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication in arbitrary finite two-player games. | |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11571/32917 | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
Copyright © 2022