Summary. This article aims to discuss the concepts of social freedom and freedom of choice in the writings of Felix E. Oppenheim. The author argues that Oppenheim’s analysis of the concept of social freedom undervalues the significance of a double distinction: between action and choice of the agent, between opportunity and capacity (of action and choice). On this basis, the author presents a neutral definition of the concepts of overall freedom and social freedom, which distinguishes the concept of freedom, conceived like lack of external constraints on the agent, from that of capacity or power.
Felix Oppenheim e l'analisi della libertà sociale
MAGNI, SERGIO FILIPPO
2004-01-01
Abstract
Summary. This article aims to discuss the concepts of social freedom and freedom of choice in the writings of Felix E. Oppenheim. The author argues that Oppenheim’s analysis of the concept of social freedom undervalues the significance of a double distinction: between action and choice of the agent, between opportunity and capacity (of action and choice). On this basis, the author presents a neutral definition of the concepts of overall freedom and social freedom, which distinguishes the concept of freedom, conceived like lack of external constraints on the agent, from that of capacity or power.File in questo prodotto:
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