Despite strong economic and business interests in Asia, there is near consensus amongst scholars and analysts that the EU remains reluctant (and unable) to develop a security profile in Asia in accordance with its business and economic interests and influence in the region. This, as EU policymakers usually point out, is not least due to the fact that the EU institutions’ mandate and authority to implement foreign and security policies on behalf of EU 27 Member States are too limited to ‘do’ more with regards to global security, including in Asia. If that is true (and EU policymakers insist it is), then the EU Commission and EU Council do all they ‘can’ or all they are ‘allowed’ to do with regards to (hard) Asian security which translates into a very limited or even a ‘non-role’ in Asian hard security.
The EU’s relations with China, Japan and North Korea-implications for the EU’s role and engagement in Asian security
BERKOFSKY, AXEL
2011-01-01
Abstract
Despite strong economic and business interests in Asia, there is near consensus amongst scholars and analysts that the EU remains reluctant (and unable) to develop a security profile in Asia in accordance with its business and economic interests and influence in the region. This, as EU policymakers usually point out, is not least due to the fact that the EU institutions’ mandate and authority to implement foreign and security policies on behalf of EU 27 Member States are too limited to ‘do’ more with regards to global security, including in Asia. If that is true (and EU policymakers insist it is), then the EU Commission and EU Council do all they ‘can’ or all they are ‘allowed’ to do with regards to (hard) Asian security which translates into a very limited or even a ‘non-role’ in Asian hard security.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
