In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unionsconcern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the trade unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also show that central bank conservatism or administrative ceilings on public expenditure may be ineffective, as tax rates and real wage claims are strategic substitutes.

The macroeconomics of social pacts

Tirelli P;
2009-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unionsconcern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the trade unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also show that central bank conservatism or administrative ceilings on public expenditure may be ineffective, as tax rates and real wage claims are strategic substitutes.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11571/1314606
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