Is the acknowledgment that animals are rational a good reason for choosing not to eat them? This question was famously answered in the affirmative by Porphyry in De abstinentia, a text which circulated in the 16th century thanks to the editio princeps (1548) and the publication of a Latin translation (1547). The aim of this essay is to show how discussion on the rationality of animals interacts with reflections on the topic of vegetarianism in the writings of Tommaso Campanella, who (especially in the Metaphysica) agrees with Porphyry in stating that animals do partake in rationality, thus following Telesio’s critique of Aristotle’s psychology. But while Porphyry had drawn a clear line between plants (devoid of sensation) and animals (all capable of suffering), Campanella understands sensation as being present continuously throughout nature – and this ultimately leads to reversing Porphyry’s argument in favour of vegetarianism. This anti-vegetarian conclusion also leads Campanella to enquire what type of food each living creature should eat, and whether it would be acceptable for man the eat members of his own species. The last section of the essay thus investigates the link between vegetarianism and cannibalism, offering a new perspective on Campanella’s theoretical and practical distinction between man and the animals.
Eating (Rational) Animals: Campanella on the Rationality of Animals and the Impossibility of Vegetarianism
MURATORI C
2013-01-01
Abstract
Is the acknowledgment that animals are rational a good reason for choosing not to eat them? This question was famously answered in the affirmative by Porphyry in De abstinentia, a text which circulated in the 16th century thanks to the editio princeps (1548) and the publication of a Latin translation (1547). The aim of this essay is to show how discussion on the rationality of animals interacts with reflections on the topic of vegetarianism in the writings of Tommaso Campanella, who (especially in the Metaphysica) agrees with Porphyry in stating that animals do partake in rationality, thus following Telesio’s critique of Aristotle’s psychology. But while Porphyry had drawn a clear line between plants (devoid of sensation) and animals (all capable of suffering), Campanella understands sensation as being present continuously throughout nature – and this ultimately leads to reversing Porphyry’s argument in favour of vegetarianism. This anti-vegetarian conclusion also leads Campanella to enquire what type of food each living creature should eat, and whether it would be acceptable for man the eat members of his own species. The last section of the essay thus investigates the link between vegetarianism and cannibalism, offering a new perspective on Campanella’s theoretical and practical distinction between man and the animals.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.