The evolution toward sixth-generation (6G) networks envisions humans as active nodes within a fully interconnected digital ecosystem, supported by data collected from in-body and on-body sensors. Since many of these devices are not equipped to connect directly to 6G networks, Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) serve as an essential intermediate layer. However, conventional radio-frequency technologies face limitations in terms of energy efficiency, security, and data integrity, motivating the adoption of lightweight security mechanisms. Physical Layer Security (PLS), and in particular Physical Key Extraction (PKE), offers a promising solution by enabling legitimate devices to derive shared cryptographic keys from the reciprocal properties of the communication channel. Galvanic coupling (GC) communication has recently emerged as an on-body transmission technology alternative to radio-frequency (RF), which exploits low-power electrical signals propagating through biological tissue. Building on prior feasibility studies, this work proposes a PKE framework tailored to GC channels, integrating a lightweight key reconciliation method, based on Hamming (7,4) error-correction codes, and evaluating system performance through dedicated reliability and security Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Results reveal a trade-off shaped by electrode placement and channel quantization parameters. Among the ones tested, the optimal configuration is achieved with a 3 cm transverse inter-electrode spacing at both transmitter and receiver, and a 3 cm longitudinal separation between transmitter and receiver, by quantizing the channel impulse response with two quantization bits. While this work focuses on validating the method in controlled conditions in order to establish a reliable study framework, future developments will focus on enhanced reconciliation, privacy amplification, and analysis of the GC channel considering physiological and environmental variations.
Physical Key Extraction in Galvanic Coupling Communications: Reliability and Security Analysis
Vizziello, Anna;Savazzi, Pietro;
2026-01-01
Abstract
The evolution toward sixth-generation (6G) networks envisions humans as active nodes within a fully interconnected digital ecosystem, supported by data collected from in-body and on-body sensors. Since many of these devices are not equipped to connect directly to 6G networks, Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) serve as an essential intermediate layer. However, conventional radio-frequency technologies face limitations in terms of energy efficiency, security, and data integrity, motivating the adoption of lightweight security mechanisms. Physical Layer Security (PLS), and in particular Physical Key Extraction (PKE), offers a promising solution by enabling legitimate devices to derive shared cryptographic keys from the reciprocal properties of the communication channel. Galvanic coupling (GC) communication has recently emerged as an on-body transmission technology alternative to radio-frequency (RF), which exploits low-power electrical signals propagating through biological tissue. Building on prior feasibility studies, this work proposes a PKE framework tailored to GC channels, integrating a lightweight key reconciliation method, based on Hamming (7,4) error-correction codes, and evaluating system performance through dedicated reliability and security Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Results reveal a trade-off shaped by electrode placement and channel quantization parameters. Among the ones tested, the optimal configuration is achieved with a 3 cm transverse inter-electrode spacing at both transmitter and receiver, and a 3 cm longitudinal separation between transmitter and receiver, by quantizing the channel impulse response with two quantization bits. While this work focuses on validating the method in controlled conditions in order to establish a reliable study framework, future developments will focus on enhanced reconciliation, privacy amplification, and analysis of the GC channel considering physiological and environmental variations.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


