In Chapter 3 Magnani argues, building on his 2007 book Morality in a Technological World , that knowledge has to become a duty in our current technological world. It is evident that the new ethical importance acquired by many ‘external things’ (both natural and artifi cial) has been mainly caused by modern technological achievements. According to Magnani, this has two consequences: first, we need appropriately to project values to people that we tend to attribute to things ; secondly, he delineates a new role of knowledge (both scientific and ethical). Magnani suggests that in our technological world a more massive and skilful exploitation of knowledge is needed. Within the scope of the intellectual framework sketched above, he proposes that enhancing free will, freedom, responsibility and ownership of our destinies is one of the main targets for improving human dignity in our technological era, and that to achieve this the respect of knowledge is essential. However, knowledge as a duty also has various limitations. He warns against the problem of identity and cyberprivacy, and contends that when too much knowledge about people is incorporated in external artifi cial things, human beings’ ‘visibility’ can become excessive and dangerous. People have to be protected from being seen but also from ‘feeling’ visible to avoid, for example, ostracism and stigmatisation, to be protected from insult, to avoid becoming more conformist and conventional, and to avoid the possibility of being oppressed. The chapter concludes by examining how privacy also entails the protection against interference with the self-realisation of the individual.

Abducing personal data, destroying privacy. Diagnosing profiles through artifactual mediators.

MAGNANI, LORENZO
2013

Abstract

In Chapter 3 Magnani argues, building on his 2007 book Morality in a Technological World , that knowledge has to become a duty in our current technological world. It is evident that the new ethical importance acquired by many ‘external things’ (both natural and artifi cial) has been mainly caused by modern technological achievements. According to Magnani, this has two consequences: first, we need appropriately to project values to people that we tend to attribute to things ; secondly, he delineates a new role of knowledge (both scientific and ethical). Magnani suggests that in our technological world a more massive and skilful exploitation of knowledge is needed. Within the scope of the intellectual framework sketched above, he proposes that enhancing free will, freedom, responsibility and ownership of our destinies is one of the main targets for improving human dignity in our technological era, and that to achieve this the respect of knowledge is essential. However, knowledge as a duty also has various limitations. He warns against the problem of identity and cyberprivacy, and contends that when too much knowledge about people is incorporated in external artifi cial things, human beings’ ‘visibility’ can become excessive and dangerous. People have to be protected from being seen but also from ‘feeling’ visible to avoid, for example, ostracism and stigmatisation, to be protected from insult, to avoid becoming more conformist and conventional, and to avoid the possibility of being oppressed. The chapter concludes by examining how privacy also entails the protection against interference with the self-realisation of the individual.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11571/311105
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